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Abstract. Despite the availability of very detailed data on ﬁnancial markets,
agent-based modeling is hindered by the lack of information about real trader
behavior. This makes it impossible to validate agent-based models, which are
thus reverse-engineering attempts. This work is a contribution towards building
a set of stylized facts about the traders themselves. Using the client database
of Swissquote Bank SA, the largest online Swiss broker, we ﬁnd empirical
relationships between turnover, account values and the number of assets in
which a trader is invested. A theory based on simple mean-variance portfolio
optimization that crucially includes variable transaction costs is able to reproduce
faithfully the observed behaviors. We ﬁnally argue that our results bring to light
the collective ability of a population to construct a mean-variance portfolio that
takes into account the structure of transaction costs.
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1. Introduction
The availability of large data sets on ﬁnancial markets is one of the main reasons behind
the number and variety of works devoted to their analysis in various ﬁelds, and especially
so in econophysics, since physicists very much prefer to deal with very large data sets. At
the macroscopic level, the analysis of millions of tick-by-tick data points uncovered striking
regularities of price, volume, volatility and order booking dynamics (see [1]–[4] for reviews).
Since these phenomena are caused by the behavior of individual traders, news and the interplay
between the two, ﬁnding a microscopic mechanism that allows agent-based models to reproduce
some of these stylized facts is an important endeavor meant to give us insight into the causes
of large ﬂuctuations, be it herding [5], competition for predictability [6], portfolio optimization
leading to market instability [7] or chaotic transitions [8].
Market phenomenology appears as a typical example of collective phenomena to the eyes
of statistical physicists. Thus, the temptation to regard the numerous power laws found in
empirical works as signatures of criticality is intense. But if the former are really due to a
phase transition, one wishes at least to know what the phases are, which is hard to guess from
the data alone. According to early herding theoretical models [5], the phase transition may lie
in the density of social communication and imitation, and is of percolation type, thereby linking
power-law distributed price and volume, criticality and agent behavior. The standard Minority
Game (MG) [9] also has a single phase transition point where market predictability is entirely
removed by the agents, without any specular effect on price and volume. On the other hand,
grand-canonical MGs [10]–[13] that allow the agents not to play have a semi-line of critical
points that do produce stylized facts of price, volume and volatility dynamics. In the framework
of statistical physics, the phase transition is due to symmetry breaking, i.e. it is a transition
between predictable and perfectly efﬁcient markets. This also suggests that the emergence of
large ﬂuctuations is due to market efﬁciency.
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There are, of course, many other possible origins of power laws in ﬁnancial markets that
have nothing to do with a second-order phase transition. The simplest mechanism is to consider
multiplicative random walks with a reﬂecting boundary [14]. Long-range memory of volatility
is well reproduced in agent-based models whose agents act or do nothing depending on a
criterion based on a random walk [15]. Assuming pre-existing power-law distributed wealth,
an effective theory of market phenomenology links the distributions of price returns, volume
and trader wealth [16]. On the other hand, markets are able to produce power-law distributed
price returns by simple mechanisms of limit order placement and removal without the need for
wealth inequality [17, 18]. However, in turn, one needs to explain why limit orders are placed in
such a manner. The heterogeneity of time scales may provide an explanation for order placement
far away from best prices if power law distributed [19], but additional work is needed in order
to explain order placement near best prices, which causes these large price moves. Finally, a
recent simple model of investment with leverage is able to reproduce some stylized facts [20].
But mechanisms alone may not be sufﬁcient to replicate the full complexity of ﬁnancial
markets, as some part of it may lie instead in the heterogeneity of the agents themselves. While
the need for heterogeneous agents in this context is intuitive (see, e.g., [21]), there are no easily
available data against which to test or to validate microscopically an agent-based model. Even
if it is relatively easy to design agent-based models that reproduce some of the stylized facts
of ﬁnancial markets (see, e.g., [6, 8], [22]–[24]), one never knows whether this is achieved for
good reasons, except for volatility clustering [15]: it is to be expected that real traders behave
sometimes at odds with one’s intuition. Thus, without data about the traders themselves, one
is left with the often frustrating and time-consuming task of reverse-engineering the market in
order to determine the good ingredients indirectly. Some progress has been made recently with
the analysis of transactions in the Spanish stock market aggregated by brokers [25], hence with
mesoscale resolution.
Data on trader behavior are found in the ﬁles of brokers, usually shrouded in secrecy. But
this lack of data accessibility is not entirely to blame for the current ignorance of real-trader
dynamics: researchers, even when given access to broker data, have focused on trading gains
and behavioral biases, often with factor-based analyses (see, e.g., [26]–[28]).
We aim at providing a coherent picture of how various types of traders behave and interact,
making it possible for agent-based models to rest on a much more solid basis. This paper is
the ﬁrst of a series that will establish stylized facts about trader characteristics and behavior.
One of the most important aspects of these papers will be to characterize the heterogeneity of
the traders in all respects (account value, turnover, trading frequency, behavioral biases, etc)
and the relationships between these quantities in probability distribution, not with factors. This
paper is ﬁrst devoted to the description of the large data set that we use. It then focuses on the
relationship between trader account value, turnover per transaction and transaction costs, both
empirically and theoretically. We will show that, while the traders have a spontaneous tendency
to build equally weighted portfolios, the number of stocks in a portfolio increases nonlinearly
with their account value, which we link to portfolio optimization and broker transaction fee
structure.
2. Description of the data
Our data are extracted from the database of the largest Swiss online broker, Swissquote Bank
SA (further referred to as Swissquote). The sample contains comprehensive details about all the
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19 million electronic orders sent by 120 000 professional and non-professional online traders
from January 2003 to March 2009. Of these orders, 65% have been canceled or have expired and
30% have been ﬁlled; the remaining 5% were still valid as of 31 March 2009. Since this study
focuses on turnover as a function of account value, we chose to exclude orders for products
that allow traders to invest more than their account value, also called leveraging, i.e. orders
to margin-calls markets, such as the foreign exchange market (FOREX) and the derivative
exchange EUREX. The resulting sample contains 50% of orders for derivatives, 40% for stocks
and 4% for bonds and funds. Finally, 70% of these orders were sent to the Swiss market, 20%
to the German market and about 10% to the US market.
Swissquote clients consist of three main groups: individuals, companies and asset
managers. Individual traders, also referred to as retail clients, are mainly non-professional
traders acting on their own account. The accounts of companies are usually managed by
individuals trading on behalf of a company and, as we shall see, they behave very much like
retail clients, albeit with a larger typical account value. Finally, asset managers manage accounts
of individuals and/or companies, some of them dealing with more than a thousand clients. Their
behavior differs markedly from that of the other two categories of clients.
3. Results
3.1. Account values
Numerous studies have been devoted to the analysis and modeling of wealth dynamics and
distribution among a population (see [30] and references therein). The general picture is that, in
a population, a very large majority lies in the exponential part of the reciprocal cumulative
distribution function (RCDF), while the wealth of the richest people is Pareto-distributed,
i.e. according to a power law.
The account value of Swissquote traders is by deﬁnition the sum of all their assets (cash,
stock, bonds, derivatives, funds, deposits) and is denoted Pv. In order to simplify our analysis,
we compute Pv once per day after US markets close and take this value as a proxy for the next
day’s account value. Figure 1 displays this distribution computed at the time of the ﬁrst and last
transactions of the clients. Results are shown for the three main categories of clients. Maximum
likelihood ﬁts to the tail of the individual traders to the Pareto model p(x) ∼ (x/xmin)−γ
were performed using the BCa bootstrap method of [31] and determining the parameter
xmin by minimizing the Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistics as in [29]. Results are reported in
table 1.
The values of γ are in line with the wealth distribution of all major capitalistic
countries (see [32] for a possible origin of Pareto exponents between 2.3 and 2.5). Thus the
retail clients are most probably representative of the Swiss population. The account value
distributions of companies and asset managers have no clear power-law tails, in agreement
with the results of a recent model that suggests a log-normal distribution of mutual fund asset
sizes [33, 34]. Consequently, ﬁgure 1 also reports a ﬁt of the data to log-normal distributions
ln N (μ, σ 2), which approximate more faithfully P>(Pv) than the Student and the Weibull
distributions for the three categories of clients, except its extreme tail, in the case of retail
clients.
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Table 1. Results of the ﬁts of the Pareto law (x/xmin)γ to the account value Pv of
individuals.
Individuals γ xmin
First transaction 2.33 ∈ [2.29, 2.37]95 2.30 × 106 ∈ [1.99 × 106, 2.59 × 106]
Last transaction 2.39 ∈ [2.33, 2.44]95 3.73 × 106 ∈ [3.15 × 106, 4.29 × 106]
Figure 1. RCDF of the portfolio value Pv for the three categories of clients at the
time of their ﬁrst (empty symbols) and last (ﬁlled symbols) transactions. Several
models have been ﬁtted to the data by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE):
the Student distribution (Pareto with plateau), the Weibull (stretched exponential)
and the log-normal distribution. The best candidate, determined graphically and
via bootstrapping the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test [29], was found to be the log-
normal distribution, which is the only one shown here for the sake of clarity.
The dashed line in light blue results from an MLE ﬁt to the tail of the individual
traders with the Pareto distribution p(x) ∼ (x/xmin)−γ (see section 3.1).
3.2. Mean turnover
The turnover of a single transaction i , denoted by Ti , is deﬁned as the price paid times the
volume of the transaction and does not include transaction fees. We have excluded the traders
that have leveraged positions on stocks, hence Ti  Pv. More generally one wishes to determine
how the average turnover of a given trader relates to his portfolio value. In passing, since P(Pv)
has fat tails, the only way the distribution of T can avoid having fat tails is if the typical turnover
5
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[a.u.]
(a) Stocks (b) Derivatives
Figure 2. Reverse cumulative distribution function of the mean turnover per
transaction for the three categories of clients and for both stock and derivative
transactions. In the insets, the tail part of the RCDF of 〈Tnorm〉 = 〈T 〉 /mean(〈T 〉).
The solid curves are maximum likelihood ﬁts to (1) for stocks and (2) for
derivatives. The dotted lines are ﬁts to the Weibull distribution and the dashed
lines to the log-normal distribution (table 3).
Table 2. Parameter values and 95% conﬁdence intervals for the MLE ﬁt of the
account values to the log-normal distribution ln N (μ, σ 2). For each category of
investors, the ﬁrst and second rows correspond to the account value at the time of
the ﬁrst and last transactions, respectively (see text). Note that portfolio values
have been multiplied by an arbitrary number for conﬁdentiality reasons. This
only affects the value of μ.
μ σ
Individuals 13.94 ± 0.02 2.87 ± 0.01
14.25 ± 0.02 2.01 ± 0.01
Companies 16.0 ± 0.2 2.0 ± 0.1
15.9 ± 0.2 2.4 ± 0.1
Asset managers 16.7 ± 0.2 1.8 ± 0.1
16.7 ± 0.2 2.0 ± 0.1
is proportional to log(Pv). We denote by 〈T 〉 the mean turnover per transaction for a given client
over the history of his activities.
Figure 2 reports its RCDF for stocks and derivatives for the three categories of clients;
all RCDFs have a ﬁrst plateau and then a fat tail. For stocks, the tails are not pure power
laws, but they are for derivatives. Indeed, ﬁtting the RCDFs with Weibull, log–normal and
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Table 3. Results of the maximum likelihood ﬁt of P>(〈T 〉) with (1) and (2) for
the three categories of clients. The 95% conﬁdence intervals reported in smaller
character are computed by the biased-corrected accelerated (BCa) bootstrap
method of [31].
Stocks (1) Derivatives (2)
γ β × 10−6 γ
Individuals 1.97 0.98 1.98
[1.83, 2.10] [0.46, 1.5] [1.91, 2.15]
Companies 1.29 1.66 –
[1.52, 1.89] [0.44, 2.3]
Asset managers 1.93 0.91 –
[1.47, 2.93] [−7.8, 4.5]
Zipf–Mandelbrot distributions with an exponential cut-off, deﬁned as
F (1)> (x) =
cγ e−βx
(c + x)γ
, (1)
clearly shows that the latter is the only one that does not systematically underestimate the tail
of the RCDF for stocks. Estimated values of β and γ are given in table 3.
The RCDFs related to the turnover of transactions on derivative products have clearer
power-law tails for retail clients, which we ﬁtted with a standard Zipf–Mandelbrot function,
deﬁned as
F (2)> (x) =
cγ
(c + x)γ
. (2)
The parameters estimated are to be found in table 3. Because of the power-law nature of
this tail, ﬁts with Weibull and log-normal distributions are not very good in the tails. While the
decision process that allocates a budget to each type of product may be essentially the same,
the buying power is larger for derivative products, which may explain the absence of a cut-off.
Fits for companies and asset managers is very difﬁcult and mostly non-conclusive because of
insufﬁcient sample size. The good quality of the tail collapse (see inset) tends to indicate that the
three distributions are identical, but we could not ﬁt the RCDF of companies and asset managers
with (2). As reported in ﬁgure 2(b), log-normal distributions are adequate choices in these cases.
Since the quality of the ﬁts is poor, we do not report the resulting parameters.
3.3. Mean turnover versus account value
The relationship between 〈T 〉 and 〈Pv〉 is important as it dictates what fraction of their investable
wealth the traders exchange in markets. We ﬁrst produce a scatter plot of 〈log T 〉 versus 〈log Pv〉
(ﬁgure 4). In a log–log scale plot, it shows a cloud of points that is roughly increasing. A density
plot is, however, clearer for retail clients as there are many more points (ﬁgure 3).
These plots make it clear that there are simple relationships between log T and log Pv.
A robust non-parametric regression method [34] reveals a double linear relationship between
7
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Figure 3. Density plot of the average log T versus the average log Pv, robust
non-parametric ﬁt (red line) and linear ﬁts (dashed lines).
〈log T 〉 and 〈log Pv〉 for all three categories of investors (see ﬁgures 3 and 4),
〈log T 〉 = βx 〈log Pv〉 + ax , (3)
where x = 1 when 〈log Pv〉 < 1 and x = 2 when 〈log Pv〉 > 2. Fitted values with conﬁdence
intervals are reported in table 4.
This result is remarkable in two respects: (i) the double linear relation, not obvious to the
naked eye, separates investors into two groups, and (ii) the ranges of values where the transition
occurs is very similar across the three categories of traders.
The relationships above only apply to averages over all the agents. This means that there
are some intrinsic quantities that make all the agents deviate from this average line. Detailed
examination of the regression residuals show that the latter are, for the most part (i.e. more than
95%), normally distributed with constant standard deviations ξx and that the residuals deviating
from the normal distributions are not fat-tailed. This directly suggests the simple relation for
individual traders
T i = eax+δi ax (Piv)βx  ex , (4)
where T i and Piv are, respectively, the turnover and portfolio value of investor i , and δi ax are
i.i.d. N (0, ξ 2x ) idiosyncratic variations independent of Pv that mirror the heterogeneity of the
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Table 4. Parameter values and 95% conﬁdence intervals for the double linear
model (4). For each category of investors, the ﬁrst and second rows correspond,
respectively, to 〈logPv〉1 and 〈logPv〉2. For conﬁdentiality reasons, we
have multiplied Pv and T by a random number. This only affects the true values
of ax and  in the table.
βx ax ξ  R2
Individuals 0.84 ± 0.02 0.73 ± 1.25 0.71 14 0.52
0.54 ± 0.01 5.07 ± 0.15 0.77 14.5 0.40
Companies 0.81 ± 0.13 1.12 ± 8.17 0.88 15.5 0.47
0.50 ± 0.07 5.82 ± 1.65 1.00 15.6 0.33
Asset managers 0.89 ± 0.20 −0.31 ± 0.76 0.62 15.5 0.52
0.63 ± 0.08 3.28 ± 5.78 0.62 16.5 0.46
(a) (b)
Figure 4. Density plot of the average log T versus the average log Pv, robust
non-parametric ﬁt (red line) and linear ﬁts (dashed lines).
agents. As we shall see, portfolio optimization with heterogeneous parameters yields this precise
relationship.
3.4. Turnover rescaled by account value
Let us now measure the typical fraction of wealth exchanged in a single transaction, deﬁned as
Q = 〈 TPv 〉. Since the inverse of this ratio is an indirect (and imperfect) proxy of the number N
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(a) (b)
Figure 5. Reverse cumulative distribution function of Q = 〈 TPv 〉, the mean ratio
of the turnover over the portfolio value for individual traders (black), companies
(red) and asset managers (green). The left plot is in lin-log scale and the right
plot is in log-lin scale. The solid lines come from theoretical predictions of
section 3.4.2.
of assets that a trader owns, it also indicates how well diversiﬁed his investments are. Hence, it
can be viewed as a simple proxy of the risk proﬁles of the agents.
3.4.1. Data. Figure 5 shows that the distributions look exponential to the naked eye for about
90% of the individuals and nearly 80% of the companies, while that of the asset managers is
rapidly more complex than a simple exponential. We derive exact relationships for this quantity
in section 3.4.2 that show that these distributions are in fact not exponential but log-normal.
The resulting picture is that only a small fraction of customers trade a large fraction of
their wealth, on average. Interestingly, these ﬁgures show a clear difference between the three
categories of clients. As discussed above, ﬁgure 5 roughly reﬂects the risk proﬁle of the different
types of customers: less than 10% of asset managers trade, on average, more than 20% of their
clients’ capital in a single transaction; this rises to 30% for companies and 45% for retail clients.
Note, however, that, despite the fact that the account values of companies and asset managers
are comparable, companies tend to have a Q closer to that of the individuals. This suggests
either that companies hold a smaller N than asset managers for the same account value, or that
asset managers tend to make smaller adjustments to the quantities of assets.
3.4.2. Theory. Since we know the distributions of T , Pv and their relationship, we are in a
position to derive analytical expressions for Qi = 〈 T (t)Pv(t)〉 of investor i . The distribution of Q
across the population of online investors can be easily found using (4) and the distribution of
Pv. Let PT,Pv(t, pv) denote the joint distribution of T and Pv:
PQ=T/Pv(q) =
∫ ∞
0
pvPT,Pv(qpv, pv) dpv =
∫ ∞
0
pvPT |Pv(qpv|pv)PPv(pv) dpv. (5)
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Let us now assume for the sake of clarity that T = ea+δa Pβv . Given Pv, the turnover
T follows a log-normal distribution with mean log pv + a and variance ξ 2. Substituting
PT |Pv(t |pv) = ln N (log pv + a, ξ 2) in (5) leads, after some simpliﬁcations, to
PQ(q) =
∫ ∞
0
1√
2πξ 2q
exp
(
−
(
log(qp1−βv )− a
)2
2ξ 2
)
PPv(pv) dpv, (6)
and
FQ(q) =
∫ q
0
PQ(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
1
2
erfc
(
a − log(qp1−βv )√
2ξ
)
PPv(pv) dpv, (7)
where erfc(x) = 2√
π
∫∞
x
e−y
2 dy is the complementary error function. As expected, when β = 0
(i.e. T and Pv are independent), we recover the product of the two marginal distributions. On
the other hand, when β = 1, i.e. when T is proportional to Pv, PQ(q) = ln N (a, ξ 2), which
is the distribution of the factor ea+δa. For other values of β, the functions PQ and FQ cannot
be determined analytically unless PPv takes a particular form, as shown below. However, the
moments of PQ(q) can be arranged in a simpler form,
E(qn) =
∫ ∞
0
qn PQ(q)dq = ena+(1/2)n2ξ2
∫ ∞
0
1
pn(1−β)v
PPv(pv) dpv, (8)
that is, the (log-normal) moments of T/Pv times an integral term smaller or equal to 1 (because
in practice PPv(pv) > 1).5 Hence, the relation E(qn) ena+(1/2)n
2ξ2 with equality when β = 1
holds for any distribution of the account value Pv.
In section 3.1, we have shown that the distribution of Pv is well approximated by a
log-normal distribution. This particular choice of distribution makes the previous integrals
analytically tractable. Indeed, with PPv = ln N (μ, σ 2), straight integration of (6) leads to
PQ = ln N (M, S2), where M = a − (1 −β)μ and S2 = ξ 2 + (1 −β)2σ 2. This simple result has
some practical interest: given the distribution parameters and the coupling factor β, one can
draw realistic q factors for agent-based modeling as Q = eM+SX , where X is N(0, 1) distributed.
Furthermore, in the next section, we show how the value of β may be inferred from the
transaction cost structure, which decreases the number of parameters to four.
Figure 5 conﬁrms the validity of the above theoretical results, once expanded to the case
of a bilinear relation between T and Pv. It is noteworthy that the continuous lines are no ﬁts on
empirical q factors, but use instead the results of the separate ﬁts on the turnover and account
distributions.
4. The inﬂuence of transaction costs on trading behavior: optimal
mean-variance portfolios
Apart from risk proﬁles, education and typical wealth, the differences in the turnover as a
function of wealth observed above between the three populations of traders may also lie in the
difference of their actual transaction cost structure. Swissquote current standard structure for
the Swiss market (its shape is very similar for European and US markets) is shown in ﬁgure 6.
It is a piece-wise constant, nonlinear-looking function. Fitting all segments to equation (10)
5 Mathematically, all the moments of Q always exist since β  1 and Pv(pv) must decay faster than p−1v to be a
valid distribution.
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Figure 6. Swissquote fee curve for the Swiss stock market. Commissions based
on a sliding scale of costs are common practice in the world of online ﬁnance.
The red line results from a nonlinear ﬁt to equation (10). Parameter values are
C = 0.13 ∈ [0.05, 0.5]95 and δ = 0.63 ∈ [0.5, 0.74]95, where the 95% conﬁdence
intervals are obtained from the BCa bootstrap method of [31].
gives δ = 0.63 ∈ [0.5, 0.74]95. The fee structure of most brokers is not set in stone and can be
negotiated. A frequent request is to have a ﬂat fee, i.e. a ﬁxed cost per transaction corresponding
to a constant function. Since quite clearly the negotiation power of large clients or of clients that
carry out many transactions is more important, asset managers are more likely to obtain a more
favorable fee structure than basic retail clients.
Since buying some shares of an asset is the result of an unconscious or calculated portfolio
construction process, one ﬁrst needs a theoretical reference point with which to compare the
population characteristics as measured in the previous subsection. In other words, we shall
use results from portfolio optimization theory with nonlinear transaction cost functions to
understand the results of the previous subsection.
Quite curiously, all analytical papers in the literature on optimal portfolios either neglect
transaction costs or assume constant or linear transaction cost structures; nonlinear structures
are tackled numerically. Thus, we incorporate the speciﬁc nonlinear transaction cost structure
faced by the traders under investigation in the classic one-shot portfolio optimization problem
studied by Brennan [35], who restricted its discussion to fees proportional to the number of
securities, in other words, a ﬂat fee per transaction.
Building optimal mean-variance stock portfolios consists, for a given agent, of selecting
which stock to invest in and in what proportion by maximizing the expected portfolio growth,
usually called return, while trying to reduce the resulting a priori risk. One cost function that
corresponds to such requirements is
Lλ(R) = λE(R)− Var(R), (9)
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where R is the stochastic return of the portfolio over the investment horizon (e.g. 1 month,
1 year) and λ tunes the trade-off between risk and return. As such, it can be interpreted as a
measure of an investor’s attitude towards risk: the larger λ, the more risk-averse the investor.
The return of the portfolio can be decomposed into contributions from risky assets (stocks,
derivatives, etc), the interests of the amount kept in cash and the total relative cost of broker
commission, which we denote as R = Rrisky + Rcash − Rcost. Mathematically,
• Rrisky = 
Ni=1xi Ri , where Ri is the return of stock i over this horizon, xi is the fraction of
the total wealth invested in this stock and N is the total number of investable assets; we
shall denote the total fraction of wealth invested in risky assets by x =∑Ni=1 xi ;
• Rcash = (1 − x)r , where r is the interest rate;
• Rcost =
∑N
i=1 F(xi Pv)
Pv
(1 + r), where F(x) is the amount charged by a broker to exchange an
amount x of cash into shares, or vice versa.
The focus of this section is to derive explicit relationships between F , the number of assets to
hold in a portfolio, and the account value Pv. Whereas previous works only considered special
cases for F that are not compatible with the fees structure of Swissquote, we need to introduce
a cost function that can accommodate all the standard broker commission schemes. The two
extreme cases are (i) ﬂat fee per transaction, i.e. a ﬁxed cost that does not depend on the amount
exchanged, and (ii) a proportional scheme, possibly with a maximum fee. Swissquote’s standard
scheme stands in between, and is well approximated by, a power law with a maximum fee Fmax.
We hence choose
F(xi Pv) = min
(
C(xi Pv)δ, Fmax
)
, (10)
where δ interpolates between a ﬂat fee (δ = 0), as in [35], and a proportional scheme (δ = 1) via
a power law, and C is a constant.
Following the well-known one-factor model of Sharpe [36], we assume that the return of
asset i follows the global market’s return RM with an idiosyncratic proportionality factor βi .
More speciﬁcally,
Ri = βi(RM − r) + r + εi , (11)
where εi is an uncorrelated white noise E(εi) = E(εiε j) = E(RMεi) = 0. This equation means
that the systematic idiosyncratic part of Ri only applies to the return above the risk-free interest
rate, also called the market risk premium.
This completely speciﬁes the functional Lλ. Returning to (9), one ﬁrst computes the
expectation and variance of the portfolio return:
E(R) =
N∑
i=1
xi E(Ri) + (1 − x)r −
∑N
i=1 F(xi Pv)
Pv
(1 + r),
= (E(RM)− r)
N∑
i=1
xiβi + r − (1 + r)CP1−δv
N∑
i=1
x δi , (12)
and
Var(R) = Var(Rrisky)
= Var(RM)
N∑
i=1
(xiβi)
2 +
N∑
i=1
x2i Var(εi). (13)
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Note that, since here the risk-free rate is non-random, the portfolio variance is independent of
both the risk-free investment and broker commission. This does not hold for the expected return.
In principle, the functional L depends on N , the number of assets in the portfolio, λ the risk
parameter and xi the fraction of account value to invest in risky product i . Assuming that xi is
constant for all i (i.e. equally weighted allocation), we are left with only three parameters since
xi = x/N . Thus, from the optimization of the resulting functional, one can obtain a relationship
between any two of these parameters. We are mostly interested in N as a function of x .
4.1. Nonlinear relationship between account value and number of assets
We will ﬁrst assume that agents seek the optimal fraction of their account value x∗ to invest in
N securities—N being known—given the risk-free rate r and broker commission F(xiW ). The
optimal solution is simply obtained by setting xi = x/N in (12) and (13) and by equating to
zero the derivative of (9) with respect to x . This leads to the following transcendental equation
for x∗,
x∗ = λ
2
β¯(E(RM)− r)− δ(1 + r)C(N/x∗Pv)1−δ
β¯2 Var(RM) + (1/N )Var(ε)
, (14)
where β¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 βi and Var(ε) = 1N
∑N
i=1 Var(εi) is the mean idiosyncratic volatility.
Provided that the investor risk tolerance λ has been reliably estimated, which is usually a
complex task [37], and that the Sharpe model is adequate, (14) can be used directly in a
real-world portfolio optimization problem. The βi and εi are then obtained by regressing the
returns of all the stocks with (11). The optimal solution is expected to be reliable in the absence
of signiﬁcant residual correlations between εi and ε j . In the more common situation where
λ is unknown, one can derive a second equation for the optimal number of securities on the
assumption that portfolios are sufﬁciently homogeneous, or that the investment horizon is long
enough so as to have β¯ and Var(ε) independent of N . As shown in ﬁgure 7, β¯ on the US stock
market is persistently close to the one for various time horizons and values of N , consistently
with the homogeneous assumption. Taking a few technical precautions into account [35], the
differentiation of the Lagrangian (9) with respect to N leads to
λ = Var(ε)P
1−δ
v
(1 − δ)C(1 + r) (N ∗/x)2−δ , (15)
where it is assumed that δ < 1, since for δ = 1 the optimum investment does not depend on
N through the cost function. According to (15), the agent risk tolerance increases with their
account value Pv, in agreement with various survey studies on the risk tolerance of actual
investors (see the literature review [38]). Using (14) and (15) to get rid of λ, we obtain
N 2−δ
(
1 +
δ
1 − δ
K
N
)
= K β¯(E(RM)− r)
(1 − δ)C(1 + r) (x Pv)
1−δ , (16)
where K is the ratio of residual risk to market risk deﬁned as
K = 2
(
β¯2 Var(RM)
Var(ε)
+
1
N
)−1
≈
N
1
2
Var(ε)
β¯2 Var(RM)
. (17)
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Figure 7. Box plot of empirical βs obtained from the regression of several US
stocks on the S&P500. The observation period covers 2001–2008 and returns
are computed on various time horizons t (in days). Results show that β¯ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 βi ≈ 1 for all values of t and (even small) N , consistently with the
homogeneous assumption of section 4.1.
Given the desired level of systematic risk x , (16) can be solved for N numerically in an actual
portfolio optimization. Further insight is gained by considering the high diversiﬁcation limit
N 
 1, which yields 1 + δ1−δ KN ≈ 1 in (16) and thus
N =
(
K
β¯(E(RM)− r)
(1 − δ)C(1 + r)
)1/(2−δ)
(x Pv)(1−δ)/(2−δ) , (18)
where K is given by the right-hand side of (17). The latter equation generalizes [35] to the case
of a varying cost impact represented here by the parameter δ (i.e. the result of [35] is recovered
by setting δ = 0 and βi = 1 in (18)). These results can be further generalized to non-equally
weighted portfolios by differentiating (9) with respect to xi and assuming again a homogeneous
condition for the βis.
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In essence, equation (18) says that the number of securities held in an equally weighted
mean-variance portfolio with Sharpe-like returns is related to the amount invested as
log(N ) = 1 − δ
2 − δ log(x Pv) + κ (19)
in the high diversiﬁcation limit, where κ is the pre-factor of (x Pv)(1−δ)/(2−δ) in (18). The
last equation gives N as a function of Pv for a predeﬁned x in the optimal portfolio. The
heterogeneity of the traders, beyond their account value, is not apparent yet, but may occur
both in x and κ . First each trader may have his own preference regarding the fraction of this
account to invest in risky assets, x . Therefore one should replace x by xi . Next, κ includes both
a term related to transaction costs, which does vary from trader to trader, and some measures and
expectation of market returns and variance. Each trader may have his own perception or way of
measuring them. Hence κ should also be replaced by κ i . Finally, both terms can be merged in
the same constant term ζ i = 1−δ2−δ log(xi) + κ i . This explains how the heterogeneity of the traders
is the cause of ﬂuctuations in the kind of relationships we are interested in.
5. Turnover, number of assets and account value
The above result only links N with Pv, but one also wishes to obtain relationships that involve
the turnover per transaction, T . Whereas in section 3 we have characterized the turnover of any
transaction, the results of section 4 rest on the assumption that the agents build their portfolio
by selecting a group of assets and stick to them over a period of time. This, obviously, does not
include the possibility of speculating by a series of buy and sell trades on even a single asset, nor
portfolio rebalancing, which consists of adjusting the relative proportions of some assets. We
thus have to ﬁnd a way to differentiate between portfolio building, rebalancing and speculation.
Here, we shall focus on portfolio building in order to test and link the results of section 4 to
those of section 3.
We have found a simple, effective method that can separate portfolio-building transactions
from the other ones. We assume that the transactions of trader i that correspond to the building of
his portfolio are restricted to the ﬁrst transaction of assets not traded previously. Sell orders are
ignored, since Swissquote clients cannot short sell easily. In other words, if trader i owns some
shares of assets A, B and C and then buys some shares of asset D, the corresponding transaction
is deemed to contribute to his portfolio building process. The set of such transactions is denoted
by i , while the full set of transactions is denoted by i . Any subsequent transaction of shares
of assets A, B, C or D are left out of i . The number of different assets that trader i owns is
supposed to be Ni  |i |, where |X | is the cardinal of set X . This approach assumes that a trader
always owns shares in all the assets ever traded. Surprisingly, this is by far the most common
case. We shall drop the index i from now on.
Let us now focus on T =
∑
k∈ Tk , the total turnover that helped in building his portfolio.
We should ﬁrst check how it is related to the total portfolio value Pv. Let us deﬁne 〈Pv〉, the
account value of a trader averaged at the times at which he trades a new asset. Plotting log〈Pv〉
against log T gives a cloudy relationship, as usual, but ﬁtting it with log〈Pv〉 = χ log T gives
χ = 1.03 ± 0.02 for individuals, χ = 0.99 ± 0.02 for asset managers and χ = 1.00 ± 0.01 for
companies with an adjusted R2 = 0.99 in all cases. This relationship trivially holds for the
traders who buy all their assets at once, as assumed in the portfolio model. The traders who
do not lie on this line either hold positions in cash (in which case this line is a lower bound) or
16
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Figure 8. Turnover of transactions contributing towards building a portfolio T
versus the number N of assets held by a given trader at the time of the transaction.
Green lines: non-parametric ﬁt; red lines: ﬁts of the linear part of the non-
parametric ﬁt. From left to right: companies, asset managers and individuals.
Table 5. Slope α linking log T and log N for the three trader categories.
Individuals Companies Asset managers
α 0.52 ± 0.02 0.36 ± 0.14 0.44 ± 0.13
log T ∈ [16, 19] [17, 19.8] [15.8, 18]
do not build their portfolio in a single day: they pile up positions in derivative products or stocks
whose price ﬂuctuations are the origin of the deviations from the line. But the fact that the slope
is close to 1 means that the average ﬂuctuation is zero and, hence, that, on average, trades do
not make money from the positions taken on new stocks. The consequence of this is that log Pv
can be replaced by log T in (19), thus setting x = 1,
log N = 1 − δ
2 − δ log T + κ. (20)
The x = 1 assumption is in fact quite reasonable: most Swissquote traders do not use their
trading account as savings accounts and are fully invested. We do not know what amount they
keep on their other bank accounts.
A robust non-parametric ﬁt does reveal a linear relationship between log N and log T in a
given region (N , T) ∈  (ﬁgure 8, table 5). In this region, we have
log N = α log T + β, (21)
which gives
α = 1 − δ
2 − δ . (22)
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Table 6. The results of the double linear regression of log〈T 〉 versus log〈Pv〉.
For each category of investors, the ﬁrst and second rows correspond, respectively,
to log〈Pv〉 1 and log〈Pv〉 2, where 1,2 have been determined
graphically using the non-parametric method of [34], as in section 3.3.
Parameters are as in the double linear model (4). For conﬁdentiality reasons,
we have multiplied Pv and T by a random number, which only affects the true
values of 1,2 and of the ordinate ax .
βx ax ξ  R2
Individuals 0.85 ± 0.02 0.71 ± 0.16 0.65 14.5 0.59
0.51 ± 0.01 5.62 ± 0.17 0.76 15 0.31
Companies 0.83 ± 0.17 1.03 ± 2.47 0.86 15.5 0.42
0.62 ± 0.14 3.99 ± 2.55 0.93 17 0.32
Asset managers 0.84 ± 0.25 0.45 ± 3.77 0.79 15.95 0.50
0.73 ± 0.17 1.72 ± 3.23 0.72 18 0.41
We still need to link 〈T 〉 and 〈Pv〉β. While section 3 showed that the unconditional averages
lead to 〈T 〉 ∼ 〈Pv〉β , one also ﬁnds that 〈T 〉 ∼ 〈Pv〉β. Therefore, one can write
log 〈T 〉 = β log 〈Pv〉 + const, (23)
where the ﬁtted values are reported in table 6.
Thus, one is ﬁnally rewarded with the missing link
β = 1
2 − δ , (24)
which directly involves the transaction cost structure in the relationship between turnover and
portfolio value, as argued in section 3.6 This relationship allows us to close the loop as we are
now able to relate directly the exponents linking T , N and Pv. Going back to section 3, one
understands that the existence of a bilinear relationship between log-turnover and log-account
values, i.e. of two values of β for each of the three categories of clients, is linked to two values
of δ: a ﬂat fee structure or the disregard for transaction costs leads to β = 12 , while proportional
fees (δ = 1) give β = 1.
Let us ﬁnally discuss the empirical values of α, β and δ against their theoretical
counterparts, which is summarized in table 7.
1. Small values of T: It was impossible to measure α in that case since the non-parametric
ﬁt shows a nonlinear relationship in the log–log plot for retail clients, which we trust more
since they have many more points than the graphs for the two other categories of clients.
But it may not make sense to expect a linear relationship since such a relationship is only
expected for N large enough (N  10 in practice) and a small T is related to a small N .
Thus, we can only test β = 1/(2 − δ). The reported value of β is consistent across all the
clients. Retail clients have a larger δeff = 2 − 1β than the estimated δSQ. Since the shape of
the fee structure is discontinuous, the values of these exponents can hardly be expected
6 Note that this relationship can be obtained directly by assuming that all the transactions happen at the same time
and, hence, that T = (x Pv)/N , which leads straightforwardly to (24).
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Table 7. Table summarizing the empirical and theoretical relationships between
α, β and δ.
Individuals Companies Asset managers
Small Tφ
β 0.85 ± 0.02 0.83 ± 0.17 0.84 ± 0.25
log T < 14.5 17 18
δeff = 2 − 1β 0.82 ± 0.02 0.80 ± 0.20 0.81 ± 0.30
δSQ 0.63 ∈ [0.50, 0.74] 0.63 ∈ [0.50, 0.74] 0.63 ∈ [0.50, 0.74]
δ′SQ 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79] 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79] 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79]
β˜ = 12−δSQ 0.73 ∈ [0.66, 0.74] 0.73 ∈ [0.66, 0.74] 0.73 ∈ [0.66, 0.74]
Large Tφ
β 0.51 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.14 0.73 ± 0.17
log T > 15 17 18
δeff = 2 − 1β 0.04 ± 0.02 0.39 ± 0.23 0.63 ± 0.23
αeff = 1−δeff2−δeff 0.49 ± 0.01 0.38 ± 0.09 0.27 ± 0.08
α 0.52 ± 0.02 0.36 ± 0.14 0.44 ± 0.13
log T ∈ [16, 19] [17, 19.8] [15.8, 18]
to match. However, ﬁtting the whole curve structure may be problematic in this context.
Indeed, the traders with a typical small value of T see a more linear relationship in the
region of small transaction value than when considering the whole curve. For instance,
removing the two largest segments from the fee structure yields δ′SQ = 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79],
which is not far from δeff.
2. Large values of T: The relationships between all the exponents are veriﬁed for the three
categories of clients. While not very impressive for companies and asset managers, this
result is much stronger in the case of retail clients since the relative uncertainties associated
with each measured exponent are small (1–2%). The value of βretail is of particular interest
as it corresponds to δeff = 0 or, equivalently, to a ﬂat fee structure. Going back to the fee
structure of Swissquote, one ﬁnds that the transition happens when the relative transaction
cost falls below some threshold (we cannot give its precise value for conﬁdentiality reasons;
it is smaller than 1%). A possible explanation is that either some traders with a high enough
average turnover have a ﬂat fee agreement with Swissquote or the rest of them simply
act as if they were not able to take correctly into account transaction costs. Since not all
traders have a ﬂat fee agreement, one must conclude that some traders have indeed some
problems estimating small relative fees and simply disregard them. The reported value of
β for companies and asset managers is larger than βretail, but it is more likely that the small
sample size is responsible for this discrepancy, since these two categories of clients have a
greater propensity to negotiate a ﬂat fee structure.
3. Transition between the two regimes: The transitions between the standard Swissquote and
an effective ﬂat fee structure occur at the same average value of T for the three categories
of traders (idem for T). Since there is no automatic switching between fee structures
at Swissquote for any predeﬁned value of transaction value, one is led to conclude that
this transition has behavioral origins, which is also responsible for the value at which the
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transition takes place, which, in passing, corresponds to the end of the plateau of the RCDF
of Pv in the case of retail clients (e15  3.27 × 106). As a consequence, it is likely that the
traders tend to either neglect or consider as constant transaction fees smaller than some
threshold when they build their portfolio.
6. Discussion and outlook
We have been able to determine empirically a bilinear relationship between the average log-
turnover and the average log-account value, and have argued that it comes from the transaction
fee structure of the broker and its perception by the agents. A theoretical derivation of
optimal simple one-shot mean-variance portfolios with non-linear transaction costs predicted
relationships between turnover, number of different assets in the portfolio and log-account
values that could be veriﬁed empirically. This means that the populations of traders do take
correctly on average, i.e. collectively, the transaction costs into account and act collectively
as mean-variance equally weighted portfolio optimizers. This is not to say that each trader is
a mean-variance optimizer, but that the population taken as a whole behaves as such—with
differences across populations, as discussed in the previous section. This is to be related to
ﬁndings of Kirman’s famous work on demand and offer average curves in Marseille’s ﬁsh
market [39], and more generally to what has become known as the wisdom of the crowds
(see [40] for an easy-to-read account).
The fact that the turnover depends in a nonlinear way on the account value implies that
linking the exponents of the distributions of transaction volume, buying power of large players
in ﬁnancial markets and price return is more complex than was previously thought [16]. It also
has implications for agent-based models, which from now on must take into account the fact
that the real traders do invest in a number of assets that depend nonlinearly on their wealth.
Future research will address the relationship between account value and trading frequency,
which is of utmost importance to understand if the many small trades of small investors have
a comparable inﬂuence on ﬁnancial market as those of institutional investors. This will give an
understanding of who provides liquidity and what all the nonlinear relationships found above
mean in this respect. This is also crucial in agent-based models, in which one often imposes
such a relationship by hand, arbitrarily. Conversely, one will be able to validate evolutionary
mechanisms of the agent-based model according to the relationship between trading frequency,
turnover, number of assets and account value they achieve in their steady state.
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